Financial incentives and coverage of child health interventions: a systematic review and meta-analysis by Diego G Bassani et al.
REVIEW Open Access
Financial incentives and coverage of child
health interventions: a systematic review
and meta-analysis
Diego G Bassani1,2,3*, Paul Arora2, Kerri Wazny1, Michelle F Gaffey1,2, Lindsey Lenters1, Zulfiqar A Bhutta1,4
Abstract
Background: Financial incentives are widely used strategies to alleviate poverty, foster development, and improve
health. Cash transfer programs, microcredit, user fee removal policies and voucher schemes that provide direct or
indirect monetary incentives to households have been used for decades in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
more recently in Southeast Asia. Until now, no systematic review of the impact of financial incentives on coverage
and uptake of health interventions targeting children under 5 years of age has been conducted. The objective of
this review is to provide estimates on the effect of six types of financial incentive programs: (i) Unconditional cash
transfers (CT), (ii) Conditional cash transfers (CCT), (iii) Microcredit (MC), (iv) Conditional Microcredit (CMC), (v)
Voucher schemes (VS) and (vi) User fee removal (UFR) on the uptake and coverage of health interventions
targeting children under the age of five years.
Methods: We conducted systematic searches of a series of databases until September 1st, 2012, to identify
relevant studies reporting on the impact of financial incentives on coverage of health interventions and behaviors
targeting children under 5 years of age. The quality of the studies was assessed using the CHERG criteria. Meta-
analyses were undertaken to estimate the effect when multiple studies meeting our inclusion criteria were
available.
Results: Our searches resulted in 1671 titles identified 25 studies reporting on the impact of financial incentive
programs on 5 groups of coverage indicators: breastfeeding practices (breastfeeding incidence, proportion of
children receiving colostrum and early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for six months and
duration of breastfeeding); vaccination (coverage of full immunization, partial immunization and specific antigens);
health care use (seeking healthcare when child was ill, visits to health facilities for preventive reasons, visits to
health facilities for any reason, visits for health check-up including growth control); management of diarrhoeal
disease (ORS use during diarrhea episode, continued feeding during diarrhea, healthcare during diarrhea episode)
and other preventive health interventions (iron supplementation, vitamin A, zinc supplementation, preventive
deworming). The quality of evidence on the effect of financial incentives on breastfeeding practices was low but
seems to indicate a potential positive impact on receiving colostrum, early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding and mean duration of exclusive breastfeeding. There is no effect of financial incentives on
immunization coverage although there was moderate quality evidence of conditional cash transfers leading to a
small but non-significant increase in coverage of age-appropriate immunization. There was low quality evidence of
impact of CCT on healthcare use by children under age 5 (Risk difference: 0.14 [95%CI: 0.03; 0.26]) as well as low
quality evidence of an effect of user fee removal on use of curative health services (RD=0.62 [0.41; 0.82]).
Conclusions: Financial incentives may have potential to promote increased coverage of several important child
health interventions, but the quality of evidence available is low. The more pronounced effects seem to be
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achieved by programs that directly removed user fees for access to health services. Some indication of effect were
also observed for programs that conditioned financial incentives on participation in health education and
attendance to health care visits. This finding suggest that the measured effect may be less a consequence of the
financial incentive and more due to conditionalities addressing important informational barriers.
Background
Financial incentives are becoming widely used policy
strategies to alleviate poverty, foster several aspects of
development, and improve the health of populations. It
has also been recommended as an important strategy to
reduce barriers to access to health care [1] and, more
often than not, health gains are explicit objectives of
these strategies [2]. Microcredit [3-5], user fee removal
policies [6], voucher schemes [7] and cash transfer pro-
grams [8-11] that provide direct or indirect monetary
incentives to households, with or without activity or
behavioral conditionalities, have been used for decades
in Latin American [9,12-14] and sub-Saharan African
countries [15-19], and in Southeast Asian settings
[20-24].
With an overarching goal of poverty alleviation, and an
assumption that, in general, these policies will allow mar-
ket mechanisms to help people overcome poverty, many
complex and expensive programs have been implemented
on a very large scale in some countries [7,10,25-27].
More often than not there is an expectation that care,
uptake and coverage of health interventions, and ulti-
mately health status, will improve as a consequence of
such programs and policies [18,24,28-30], as the poorest
sections of the population most often face the greatest
barriers to accessing health services [2]. In most
instances, these are financial barriers [1]; hence, removing
such impediments should lead to an increase in the
uptake of health interventions and care seeking in case of
illness. Evaluations of large programs have shown a dose-
response effect of the amount of money received on
health status [14], suggesting it may act independently of
the conditionality. In addition, many of these programs
are conditional on school attendance [9,12,31], participat-
ing in health education activities [32-34], taking children
to preventive health-care visits [9,25,31] and keeping vac-
cines up-to-date [7,10,12,13,25], which should improve
health status. Some other programs offer health educa-
tion activities [22,33,34] or streamline participants’ access
to health care [26] in addition to the financial benefit
offered, thereby addressing informational as well as finan-
cial barriers, but in many cases participation in such
activities is not a condition for receiving the financial
benefit.
Although previous systematic reviews and overviews
[1,35-37] have addressed the impact of different types of
financial incentive programs on health, no comprehensive
systematic review has been conducted on the impact of a
broad range of financial programs implemented in low-
and middle-income countries on coverage and uptake of
health interventions and behaviors targeting children
under five years of age. The objective of this review is to
provide estimates of the effect of six types of financial
incentive programs on the uptake and coverage of such
health interventions: (i) Unconditional cash transfers, (ii)
Conditional cash transfers, (iii) Unconditional microcre-
dit, (iv) Conditional microcredit, (v) Unconditional vou-
cher (vi) Conditional voucher and (vi) User fee removal.
These interventions are described in Table 1.
Methods
We systematically reviewed all studies published up to
September 1st, 2012 to identify studies with data asses-
sing the impact of financial incentives on access to child
health interventions using the Child Health Evaluation
Reference Group (CHERG) systematic review guidelines
[38]. We conducted the initial search in March 2012
and updated searches on July 2012 and September 2012.
The searches were completed using OvidSP to scan the
Pubmed, EMBASE and AMED databases. We used all
combinations of the following key search terms: Cash
transfer, voucher scheme, demand side financing, social
transfer, voucher program. We purposely included
broad categories as well as names of financial schemes
identified through previous reviews, other databases and
repositories. We included in our search variations of
names and/or acronyms of the thirty-five programs we
identified in previous publications [1,2,17,18,28,
35,39-41]. In addition, we searched variations of the
terms microcredit, microfinance, micro-insurance, and
economic empowerment, and limited the results of this
search using variations of the terms evaluation or
impact. To incorporate user fees, we adopted a previous
review’s search strategy [42], and limited to children.
Our search strategies are described in detail in Addi-
tional File 1.
We included randomized controlled trials (RCT), clus-
ter randomized controlled trials (cRCT) and observa-
tional studies reported either in peer-reviewed journals
or in institutional or commissioned reports that assessed
the impact of financial incentive programs on health
interventions targeting children under the age of five.
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Types of outcomes reported
Studies included in this review report on the impact of
financial incentive programs on five groups of coverage
indicators:
(a) Breastfeeding practices (breastfeeding incidence,
feeding of colostrum, early initiation of breastfeeding,
exclusive breastfeeding for 6 months and duration of
breastfeeding);
(b) Vaccination (coverage of full vaccination, partial
vaccination and specific vaccines);
(c) Health care use (preventive and curative health
care use, visits to health facilities for preventive and
curative reasons, visits to health facilities for check-up);
(d) Management of diarrheal diseases (ORS use, con-
tinued feeding and health care seeking);
(e) Other preventive health interventions (preventive
deworming, vitamin A and iron supplementation).
A detailed description of the outcomes included in
this review and the definitions used is presented in
Table 2.
We abstracted all available data in duplicate for each
of the outcomes and financial incentives described
above We presented effect measures as mean risk differ-
ences-in-difference and their 95% confidence intervals.
All analyses were done, using RevMan 5 (Cochrane
Collaboration).
Studies identified
After removing duplicates, our searches yielded 1,567
titles. To ensure identification of all relevant literature,
we scanned the references of all relevant articles identi-
fied through our searches. To complement our formal
search strategy, we conducted a number of searches in
Google Scholar. For these searches we used the names
of identified conditional cash transfer, unconditional
cash transfer, voucher-scheme, microfinance and food
stamp programs combined with the terms evaluation
and health and the country in which the program was
carried out. Results were sorted by relevance and the
titles and abstracts of the articles in the first ten pages
of results were scanned for inclusion. In cases where
titles and abstracts were not in English, titles and
abstracts were translated using Google Translate. In
cases where search results were obviously irrelevant,
titles and abstracts were only scanned for the first five
pages of results. Articles that had previously been found
through the formal search strategy were not pulled
again. A total of 78 Google Scholar searches were per-
formed, in which 99 articles were identified as satisfying
initial inclusion criteria. We also searched the Microfi-
nance Gateway library and screened all publications
relating to the terms health and nutrition. Of the 1,666
screened in duplicate based on titles and abstracts, 1,527
articles were excluded as obviously irrelevant. We thor-
oughly reviewed 139 full publications identified through
our searches as well as an additional five articles that
were located through scanning references of relevant
articles, also in duplicate. We excluded 119 of these arti-
cles based on criteria defined a priori, either because
they contained duplicate data to one of our included
studies, did not include an eligible financial intervention,
did not have a comparison group or relevant outcomes.
In the end, 25 studies were included [7,8,10,15,16,
21-23,25,26,33,34,40,42-53]. Figure 1 is a schematic
representation of our search.
Results
Types of reports
Just under half the studies were institutional reports and
thus were not peer-reviewed [8,10,25,33,34,43,45,47-50].
Only 36% of the studies were randomized trials. Of the
25 studies, 13 were in South America or the Caribbean
[7,8,10,25,26,34,43-45,47-49,51], 8 were in Africa
[15,16,33,40,42,50,52,53] and 4 were in South East Asia




Monetary transfers to households or individuals without pre-imposed conditionalities.
Conditional Cash
Transfer
Monetary transfers to households or individuals conditional on the recipient adopting and maintaining certain behaviors
prescribed by the cash transfer program.
Unconditional
Microcredit
Small loans offered to borrowers (usually lacking employment or credit history) without imposing conditionalities other
than re-payment of the loaned amount.
Conditional Microcredit Small loans offered to borrowers (usually lacking employment or credit history) conditional on the recipient adopting and
maintaining certain behaviors prescribed by the program in addition to re-payment of the loaned amount.
Unconditional
Voucher*
Indirect monetary transfer given by issue of coupons, vouchers, electronic card transfer or other method used to purchase
commodities from local shops or outlets.
Conditional Voucher Indirect monetary transfer given by issue of coupons, vouchers, electronic card transfer or other method used to purchase
commodities from local shops or outlets conditional on the recipient adopting and maintaining certain behaviors
prescribed by the voucher program.
User Fee Removal Total or nearly total (75% or more) removal of user fees for accessing heath services.
* No unconditional voucher programs were included in this study.
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Table 2 Definitions of outcomes included in the review and effect measure reported




Percentage of newborns receiving colostrum Mean difference in the change in percentage of newborns
receiving colostrum between intervention and control group
Early initiation of
breastfeeding
Percentage of newborns breastfed within the first hour
of life
Mean difference in the change in percentage of early initiation of
breastfeeding between intervention and control group
Exclusive
breastfeeding
Percentage of infants 0 to 5 months who are exclusively
breastfed
Mean difference in the change in percentage of exclusive




Mean duration of exclusive breasfeeding in days Mean difference in the percent change in duration of exclusive




Percentage of children under 2 years of age that are or
were breastfed
Mean difference in the change in percentage of any breastfeeding
between intervention and control group
Vaccination
BCG coverage Percentage of children that received BCG Mean difference in the change in BCG coverage between
intervention and control group
DPT-1 coverage Percentage of children that received DPT-1 vaccine Mean difference in the change in DPT-1 coverage between
intervention and control group
DPT-3 coverage Percentage of children that received DPT-3 vaccine Mean difference in the change in DPT-3 coverage between
intervention and control group
MCV coverage Percentage of children that received measles (MCV)
vaccine
Mean difference in the change in MCV coverage between
intervention and control group
Polio vaccine
coverage
Percentage of children that received polio vaccine Mean difference in the change in OPV coverage between
intervention and control group
Any vaccination
coverage
Percentage of children that received any vaccine Mean difference in the change in coverage of any antigen
between intervention and control group
Full vaccination
coverage
Percentage of children that are fully vaccinated
according to the country’s EPI schedule for their age
Mean difference in the change in coverage of EPI between




Percentage of children with a preventive health care visit
in the previous 6 months**
Mean difference in the change in the percentage of children




Percentage of children with a health care visit due to
illness in the previous 6 months**
Mean difference in the change in the percentage of children
reporting a curative health care visit between intervention and
control group
Health care use Percentage of children with any health care visit in the
previous 6 months**
Mean difference in the change in the percentage of children reporting
any health facility visit between intervention and control group
Preventive health
care visits
Mean number of child-visits for preventive reasons in the
previous month**
Mean difference in the percentage change in the number of
preventive visits between intervention and control group
Curative health care
visits
Mean number of child-visits due to illness in the
previous month**
Mean difference in the percentage change in the number of
curative visits between intervention and control group
New health care
visits
Mean number of new child-visits in the previous
month**
Mean difference in the percentage change in the number of new
visits between intervention and control group
Follow-up health
care visits
Mean number of follow-up child-visits after a curative
visit in the previous month**
Mean difference in the percentage change in the number of
follow-up visits between intervention and control group
Health care visits Mean number of any child-visit in the previous month** Mean difference in the percentage change in the number of any
visits between intervention and control group
Management of diarrhoeal disease
ORS use Percentage of children that received oral rehydration
solution during the last episode of diarrhoea
Mean difference in the change in percentage of ORS use during
latest diarrhoea episode between intervention and control group
Continued feeding Percentage of children that were fed the same amount
or more than usual during the last episode of diarrhoea
Mean difference in the change in percentage of continued feeding
during latest diarrhoea episode between intervention and control
group
Care-seeking Percentage of children that were taken to a health
facility during the last episode of diarrhoea
Mean difference in the change in the percentage of children taken
to health facility during latest diarrhoea episode between
intervention and control group
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[21-23,46]. 48% of the studies evaluated cash transfer
programs: 41% evaluated conditional cash transfer pro-
grams and 7% evaluated unconditional cash transfer
programs. 22% of the programs evaluated the effects of
removing user fees. One quarter of the studies evaluated
microcredit programs. Almost half of the programs eval-
uated (48%) had a conditional component relating to
health. For details of each study, see Additional file 2.
We present forest plots only for selected outcomes.
Additional file 3 presents forest plots for all study
outcomes.
Evidence of effect of financial incentives on breastfeeding
practices
The overall quality of evidence for the effect of financial
incentives on breastfeeding practices was low, mainly due
to the limited number of relevant studies available (Table
3). The pooled estimate from two studies suggests that
conditional microcredit programs produce an average
22% net increase in the percentage of newborns receiving
colostrum (MD=0.22; CI: 0.08 to 0.35) compared to con-
trol (Figure 2). Evidence from another two microcredit
studies suggests no statistically significant effect of either
Figure 1 Flow diagram showing identification of included studies.
Table 2 Definitions of outcomes included in the review and effect measure reported (Continued)
Other preventive health interventions
Preventive
deworming
Percentage of children that received deworming
drugs in the last 6 months**
Mean difference in the change in percentage of preventive
deworming between intervention and control group
Vitamin A
supplementation
Percentage of children that received Vitamin A
supplementation in the last 6 months**
Mean difference in the change in percentage of vitamin A
supplementation between intervention and control group
Iron
supplementation
Percentage of children that received iron
supplementation in the last 6 months**
Mean difference in the change in percentage of iron
supplementation between intervention and control group
* In the case of cross-sectional studies, the effect measure was calculated assuming no change in control group and that the baseline value for the intervention
group as equal to that of the control group.
** When reporting period is different this is noted as a limitation in the quality assessment table.
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conditional (MD=-0.01; CI: -0.03 to 0.02) or uncondi-
tional (MD=-0.06; CI: -0.16 to 0.04) microcredit pro-
grams on the prevalence of any breastfeeding among
children under two years (Table 3). Estimates of the
effect of financial incentive programs on early initiation
of breastfeeding and the prevalence and duration of
exclusive breastfeeding (measured in months) among
children under six months are based on single studies
that were published as non-peer-reviewed reports. In four
of the six studies included in these analyses of breastfeed-
ing practices, the financial incentives were conditional on
mothers’ participation in health and nutrition education
sessions that included breastfeeding promotion.
Evidence of effect of financial incentives on immunization
There is moderate or low quality evidence from condi-
tional cash transfer and conditional microcredit pro-
grams indicating no significant effect of either of these
types of financial incentive on the coverage of BCG,
DPT-1, DPT-3, measles or polio vaccination or on the
coverage of any vaccination (Table 4). Financial incen-
tives in many of the studies included in these analyses
Table 3 Quality assessment of effect estimates of financial incentives on coverage of breastfeeding practices
Intervention No. of
studies
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Figure 2 Effect of financial incentives on percentage of newborns receiving colostrum.
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Table 4 Quality assessment of effect estimates of financial incentives on coverage of child vaccination
Intervention No. of
studies



















>20% attrition in cohort

































































>20% attrition in cohort


























>20% attrition in cohort




































>20% attrition in cohort






































































Bassani et al. BMC Public Health 2013, 13(Suppl 3):S30
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/S3/S30
Page 7 of 13
were conditional on children attending preventive
healthcare visits that included vaccination (Table 4).
However, moderate quality evidence compiled from four
studies suggests that conditional transfer programs may
increase coverage of full, age-appropriate vaccination
(MD=0.05; CI: -0.01 to 0.10), but this pooled estimate is
not statistically significant (Figure 3). Estimates of the
vaccination coverage effects of unconditional cash trans-
fer or unconditional microcredit programs, or of condi-
tional voucher schemes, are based only on single
studies, some of which were published as non-peer-
reviewed reports.
Evidence of effect of financial incentives on health care use
The pooled analysis of five studies evaluating the impact
of conditional cash transfer programs on the prevalence
of preventive health care use by children shows an aver-
age 14% net increase among program participants com-
pared to non-participants (MD=0.14; CI: -0.00 to 0.29)
(Figure 4). The evidence is inconsistent across studies
however, even though the financial incentives in four of
the five programs were conditional on preventive health
visit attendance, and the overall quality of this evidence
is low given the variability in study designs, and because
only one study was reported in a peer-reviewed publica-
tion (Table 5). Even more pronounced effects were
observed for user fee removal on the prevalence
(MD=0.33; CI: 0.24 to 0.43) and on the frequency
(MD=0.99; CI: 0.71 to 1.27) (Table 5) of curative health
care use, but the overall quality of the evidence for
these effects was also low, with the pooled estimates
based on only two studies each, none of which were
randomized. Large and statistically significant effects of
user fee removal on the frequency of other types of
child health care visits were also shown in several indivi-
dual studies, but these single study estimates yield low
quality evidence only.
Evidence of effect of financial incentives on diarrhoea
management
The overall quality of evidence for the effect of financial
incentive programs on diarrhoea management outcomes
was low, with only single studies of unconditional or
conditional microcredit programs reporting on the use
of oral rehydration solutions or on care-seeking during
diarrhoea (Table 6). Two studies of conditional micro-
credit programs reported on the practice of continuing
child feeding during diarrhoea, with the pooled estimate
suggesting no effect of this type of financial incentive on
this outcome (Table 6) despite the conditionality of
mothers’ attendance of health and nutrition education
sessions to qualify for microcredit in both studies.
Evidence of effect of financial incentives on coverage of
other preventive health practices
All available evidence for the effects of financial incen-
tives on other preventive health practices come from
randomized or cluster randomized studies of uncondi-
tional or conditional cash transfer programs (Table 7).
However, only single studies report on deworming and
iron supplementation, yielding low quality evidence for
these outcomes. Moderate quality evidence pooled
from two randomized studies suggests that conditional
cash transfer programs may increase the coverage of
vitamin A supplementation (MD=0.16; CI: -0.01 to
0.34), but this pooled effect estimate is not statistically
Figure 3 Effect of financial incentives on percentage of children receiving their full EPI vaccine schedule.
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significant (Table 7). The conditionality attached to
only one of the two conditional cash transfer programs
was health-related, but this conditionality was not
monitored.
Discussion
The apparent appeal of financial incentives is based in
part on the underlying assumption that these programs
will impact child health. Because there were indications
of impacts on some child health outcomes [18], we
hypothesized that improved access to health care and
increases in coverage of child health interventions must
be important components of the pathway from the
implementation of financial incentive programs to child
health gains. However, our main finding is that there is
no high or moderate quality evidence to support this
hypothesis. Our results reveal that the evidence for an
impact of financial incentive programs on the coverage
of a broad range of health interventions among children
under five years is generally limited and of low quality.
Although evidence on a few specific outcomes may be
at maximum moderate, there is only low quality evi-
dence of an effect of financial incentives on the groups
of outcomes studied: breastfeeding practices, preventive
deworming, health care use in case of illness and pre-
ventative health care use.
Reduction or elimination of user fees is one of the few
interventions that had very large effects in the use of
health services. Although the quality of the evidence is
also low, the pronounced effects that were observed for
user fee removal on health care use deserves attention.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that one study observed
a negative effect of generalized user fee removal policies
on service use by children and pregnant women [15].
Such effect may be explained by difficulties of the health
services in meeting increased demand, and further
research is needed to clarify this association.
The role of conditionalities is one of the most impor-
tant aspects to be addressed when evaluating the impact
of financial incentive programs on health. Even in the
limited number of studies in our review, it appears that
conditioning financial incentives on health-related beha-
viors significantly influences program effect. It is chal-
lenging to attribute the health effects of conditional
financial incentive programs to the monetary compo-
nent because, theoretically, conditionality may be
Figure 4 Effect of financial incentives on percentage of children accessing preventive health care in the previous 6 months.
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Table 5 Quality assessment of effect estimates of financial incentives on coverage of child health care use
Intervention No. of
studies
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1 Before and after
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administrative data
Only one study - Uganda - Low 0.27 (0.18;
0.37)
Follow-up health care visits
User fee
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1 Before and after
design using
administrative data











1 Before and after
design using
administrative data
Clinic-level data - Uganda - Low 0.20 (0.10;
0.29)
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confounding this effect and also because programs are
not designed to allow its evaluations to separate the
effects.
Among the studies included in our review, in most
cases the conditionality is related to participation in
health activities that are directly related to the health
outcome of interest. It has been previously noted that
these health education or knowledge-transfer activities
do increase coverage of interventions [1], therefore it is
not surprising to notice that in our results all the posi-
tive effects observed for the group of breastfeeding out-
comes, for example, come from programs that were
Table 6 Quality assessment of effect estimates of financial incentives on management of diarrhoeal disease
Intervention No. of
studies
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conditional on women’s participation in health and
nutritional education activities, all of which had a strong
emphasis on breastfeeding promotion (Table 3). Similarly,
the effect of conditional transfer programs on the cover-
age of full, age-appropriate vaccination, even though not
statistically significant, is based on the pooled results of
four studies, three of which were conditional on the par-
ticipant maintaining vaccines up to date.
To strengthen this point, four of the five studies eval-
uating the impact of conditional cash transfer programs
on preventive health care use were conditional on chil-
dren attending preventive health care services routinely.
Under such circumstances, it may be surprising that the
pooled analysis yielded only a moderate 14% net
increase among program participants. This difficulty in
interpreting results of conditional financial incentives
has been noted in a previous discussion about financial
incentive programs [2], and indeed, isolating the effects
of financial and non-financial program components is a
daunting but necessary task that should be incorporated
in the design of future evaluations of such programs.
The quantitative evidence for an effect of financial
incentives and policies on the coverage of child health
interventions presented here does not support the posi-
tive findings of earlier qualitative assessments of such
programs [18,35]. Because the evidence is currently lim-
ited and of low quality, we plan to conduct systematic
updates of this analysis as new studies and evaluations
of such interventions become available. In addition, a
similar exercise to systematically evaluate the evidence
of the impact of such programs on other aspects of
child health and development, such as morbidity and
mortality, is warranted.
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